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Chapter 1
Mathematical Models of Radicalization and
Terrorism
Yaoli Chuang and Maria R. D’Orsogna
Abstract The rapid spread of radical ideologies has led to a world-wide succession
of terrorist attacks in recent years. Understanding how extremist tendencies germi-
nate, develop, and drive individuals to action is important from a cultural standpoint,
but also to help formulate response and prevention strategies. Demographic studies,
interviews with radicalized subjects, analysis of terrorist databases, reveal that the
path to radicalization occurs along progressive steps, where age, social context and
peer-to-peer exchanges play major roles. To execute terrorist attacks, radicals must
efficiently communicate with one another while maintaining secrecy; they are also
subject to pressure from counter-terrorism agencies, public opinion and the need
for material resources. Similarly, government entities must gauge which interven-
tion methods are most effective. While a complete understanding of the processes
that lead to extremism and violence, and of which deterrents are optimal, is still
lacking, mathematical modelers have contributed to the discourse by using tools
from statistical mechanics and applied mathematics to describe existing and novel
paradigms, and to propose novel counter-terrorism strategies. We review some of
their approaches in this work, including compartment models for populations of
increasingly extreme views, continuous time models for age-structured radical pop-
ulations, radicalization as social contagion processes on lattices and social networks,
agent based models, game theoretic formulations. We highlight the useful insights
offered by analyzing radicalization and terrorism through quantitative frameworks.
Finally, we discuss the role of institutional intervention and the stages at which de-
radicalization strategies might be most effective.
Yaoli Chuang
Department of Mathematics, California State University at Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Los
Angeles, CA 91330 e-mail: yaoli.chuang@csun.edu
Maria R. D’Orsogna
Department of Mathematics, California State University at Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Los
Angeles, CA 91330e-mail: dorsogna@csun.edu
1
2 Yaoli Chuang and Maria R. D’Orsogna
Fig. 1.1 Terrorist attacks between 1970-2015, from the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) as com-
piled by the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
The GTD details more than 180,000 events including bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings.
Data is entered upon reviewing news articles, court reports and other sources. Among the most
notable groups the FARC in Colombia, Shining Path in Peru, and the FMLN in El Salvador; the
Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the PIRA in Northern Ireland and the
ETA in the Basque country; Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia; ISIS, Al -Qaeda
and the Taliban in the Middle East; the LTTE and the NPA in South and Southeast Asia, as well as
several groups in Jammu and Kashmir.
1.1 Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 destroyed lives and buildings, inflict-
ing pain on many innocent families. Almost twenty years later, they have also pro-
foundly changed our lives, from the mundane aspects of boarding an airplane to
the definition of war, peace, tolerance. In their aftermath it is no longer shocking
to view a line of code, a truck, a pair of shoes, or an aircraft as part of a sinister
threat. At the same time, in the name of security and safety, we have witnessed the
erosion of some of our civil liberties, and we have come to accept that the privacy
of our email exchanges, computer log-ins, financial transactions, and travel records
may no longer be sacrosanct. One of the most troubling aspect of the September
11th events is that they instilled fear in the population, contributing to greater po-
litical polarization and divisiveness that continue to this day, periodically fueled by
segments of the media and political punditry. Of course, this is the goal of terrorism,
which in a nutshell is a political and psychological strategy to weaken the “enemy”
from within.
While on an unprecedented scale, the events of September 11th are not isolated:
terrorism, radicalization and the glorification of violence are worldwide phenomena
that aim to disrupt civilian life and threaten security. In Figure 1.1 we show global
terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2015 as compiled by the National Consortium for
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [1]. As can be seen, many corners of
the world are hotspots for terrorist activity, inspired and driven by a wide spectrum
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of motivations or ideologies that can be religious, political, nationalist or subversive.
Extremists exploit traditional and, in an increasingly globalized world, online tools
to disseminate propaganda, recruit new adherents, plot attacks [2]. They do so often
unhindered by geographical boundaries. The question of how to guarantee an open
society, freedom of expression, belief, movement while at the same time preventing
violence, is an unresolved one, dating all the way back to classical antiquity [3].
A terrorist event does not occur out of the blue. Individuals who commit these
acts have typically spent months or years “radicalizing”: reading fanatical sources,
discussing with, or emulating, others with more extreme views, becoming proac-
tive and later orchestrating the attack with like-minded peers. Numerous sociolog-
ical, psychological and economic studies have attempted to understand the over-
all process of radicalization, through demographic studies, by interviewing sub-
jects, by analyzing socio-economic backgrounds and modus operandi of extremists
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. One example is the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in
the United States (PIRUS), a database of domestic Islamist, Far Left and Far Right
radicalized individuals [12]. Distinctions have been made to differentiate when ide-
ological radicalization stays part of a belief system, however contorted, and when it
leads to bloodshed [13, 14, 15]. What has emerged is that while some general trends
can be outlined, there is no one single, key element that can explain why a person,
or a group of people, choose to reject the status quo and embrace indiscriminate
violence [16].
The making of a radical typically unfolds in a multi-step fashion and is strongly
influenced by one’s surroundings, past experiences and future prospects [17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22]. Depending on the particular socio-geographical context, four or five
main steps have been identified: pre-radicalization (at risk), self-identification (sus-
ceptible), indoctrination (moderate radical), commitment and “jihadization” (full
radicalization) [20, 23, 24]. More nuanced classifications, expanding these classes
to eight states, have also been proposed [25], while the IVEE theory focuses on three
main steps: individual vulnerability (IV), exposure (E), emergence (E) [26, 27]. The
time-scale for individuals to advance through these hierarchies varies, but case stud-
ies conducted on sixty-eight American homegrown Al-Qaeda inspired radicals re-
veal that pre-radicalization takes four to five years, while progression through the
following stages is faster and occurs over a timeframe of less than three years
[28, 29, 30, 31]. Other studies conducted on ten religious radical groups by New
York Police Department detectives, analysts and intelligence officials show that the
time spent in the at risk or in the susceptible class is approximately one and a half
and three years, respectively; the time in the more radical stages is about two years
each [20]. Overall, radicalization times are becoming shorter due to more rapid in-
formation sharing, especially online.
The seed of pre-radicalization is often rooted in various unaddressed grievances
and personal frustrations, such as lack of employment and opportunity, racial and
religious discrimination and social exclusion [32, 33, 34]. Individual malaise can
also stem from real or perceived socio-economic injustices, against policies that
are seen as too progressive, or conversely, because of the desire for sweeping soci-
etal change. Personal dissatisfaction leads to self-identification, where marginalized
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Fig. 1.2 Schematics of the radicalization process [19]. Functional, engaged individuals undergo
progressive phases of withdrawal until they set themselves apart from the rest of society. Hence-
forth, they cultivate a new identity, search like-minded individuals and prepare for violence. The
process culminates in possible terrorist attacks [20]. Not all individuals will progress through the
entire hierarchy: the number of radicalizing individuals decreases as the level of extremism in-
creases, leading to a multi-phase horizontal funnel.
or self-searching individuals gradually begin constructing new identities and rou-
tines, shifting away from old ones. Like–minded people are actively sought and new
friendships formed [35]. The process is furthered by indoctrination when bonds of
solidarity within these newly formed groups strengthen. Mutual encouragement and
the absence of a counter-dialectic allow for extremist views to self-reinforce and
become more engrained [36] . Once embraced, disavowing the new ideals becomes
difficult; justification and praise of violence follow [37]. A further activism phase
ensues, when radicals commit to militantly spread their convictions to others until
external events such as political or judiciary decisions, or simple serendipity, crys-
tallize the willingness to take violent action [38, 39]. A schematic of this process is
shown in Figure 1.2.
Radicalization typically occurs through networks of peers and may be facilitated
through technology in the form of web-based recruitment material or chat rooms
[40, 41]; ISIS is a well known internet savvy group, that uses social media to recruit
western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq [42, 43]. A recent RAND study shows
that the virtual world offers extremists the capability to communicate, collaborate
and convince without physical contact and enables connection with like-minded
individuals from across the world at all times [44]. It also may act as a modern day
echo-chamber to confirm existing beliefs.
Extremist tendencies can arise at any age and factors that are traditionally asso-
ciated with desistance from criminal or deviant behavior, such as marriage, career
and education, are not necessarily strong deterrents against ideological extremism
[4, 45]. Disenfranchised adolescents and young adults, however, are particularly vul-
nerable to indoctrination and radicalization, especially when their formative years
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Fig. 1.3 Estimated age of interviewed subjects at the first indication of radicalization. All were
radicalized within the United States, inspired by Al-Qaeda or ISIS, and committed terrorist acts
over a period of 16 years after September 11th 2001. Group B (129 individuals) is a subset of Group
A (289 individuals) for which more detailed data was available. Breaks indicate that no subjects of
that age cohort were included in the study. Although individuals can be radicalized at any age, the
process is more common during adolescence and early adulthood. Taken from Ref. [31].
are spent without purpose, education, outlook or positive role models [38]. This is
often the case for marginalized youth, religious zealots, or right-wing extremists
[46, 47] for which radicalism may provide a sense of purpose. Figure 1.3 shows
that the majority of 289 homegrown terrorists in the United States, inspired by Al-
Qaeda and ISIS, initiated their radicalization process before age 25 [31]. Although
in their infancy and mostly experimental, de-radicalization programs are being de-
veloped and implemented worldwide with great expectations. They include educa-
tion, exposure to literature, sports and arts, psychological counseling, job training
and informal one-on-one conversations [48]. The goal is to prevent radicalization,
disengage known violent extremists, and reintegration former convicted extremists
in the community [49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]. Intervention through social media has
also been advocated: it is hoped that the interactiveness afforded by the internet can
be used to help change the perceptions of budding radicals [56].
It may be natural to ask whether parallels exist between radicalization and the
process by which a propensity for crime develops. Indeed, some studies have found
similarities between becoming an extremist and joining urban street gangs [57, 58].
Several observations must however be made in this respect. Terrorists or groups of
terrorists take action much less frequently than urban criminals; radicals are driven
by deeply held ideologies and not by opportunistic, short-term rewards; selecting
the appropriate times and locations, and preparing for a terrorist attack, are much
more elaborate processes that committing street-level crimes; and finally terrorists
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typically seek worldwide attention in the aftermath of their acts, whereas burglars
and other criminals prefer anonymity. Of course, the outcomes of successful ter-
rorist and criminal acts are also much different in terms of damages inflicted to
those directly affected and to society as a whole [59, 60, 61]. Hence, although some
comparisons can be made, radicalizing and becoming an urban criminal, should be
considered distinct phenomena.
Once the radicalization process is complete, a group of like-minded extremists
may decide to turn their fanatical ideology into violent action. This requires willing-
ness, but also training, preparation, curating the logistics. Eventually, organizational
structures emerge, either organically or by design. The way individuals connect de-
pends on specific needs and choices such as targets, ideology, timing, resource avail-
ability, governmental efficiency, public opinion [15, 62]. One of the most important
determinants of terrorist connectivity is the need to balance security and efficiency:
on one hand, extremists must communicate and plan, on the other, they must protect
themselves against infiltration, threats and counter-terrorism intervention. Govern-
mental agencies must also decide the best course of action to disrupt these “dark”
networks, be it via direct repression, manipulation, or persuasion, and by consider-
ing several environmental variables, such as costs, public perception, odds of suc-
cess, information at hand. The final goal may be to splinter and dissolve the terrorist
network, to weaken its financial and societal support structure, or to moderate its
use of violence [63]. Of course, counter-terror tactics may prove to be counterpro-
ductive if they cause backlash and over-reaction in the population, so that policies
must be calibrated to be firm but not excessive or discriminatory.
At present, two main counter-terrorism schools of thought exist. The Anglo-
Saxon approach focuses on the rule of law so that only if, and after, violent acts
are committed, security agencies will intervene. There is no curtailing of the beliefs
these acts may stem from, in the name of freedom of belief and religion. The con-
tinental European approach instead attempts to prevent violence by confronting ex-
tremist ideas, especially the preaching of intolerance, before any attacks materialize
[64, 65, 66]. Both have merits and drawbacks, and are deeply rooted in the history
and national identity of the respective countries where they are applied. Finally, re-
cent studies in political terrorism have identified “waves” of terrorism as 40-year
generational cycles over which radical tendencies tend to ebb and flow [67]. Peri-
ods of heightened activity are characterized by the emergence of terror groups that
share ideology, tactics, and vision for the future, that later subside. The wave theory
of modern terrorism was crafted by David C. Rapoport [68] who reviewed terror-
ist events from the late 1800-s to the present day; it shares parallels with historian
Arthur Schlesinger’s theory of 40-year generational cycles in politics [69].
The many processes and theories described above define complex, layered sys-
tems that involve the individual, the external socio-economic environment in which
he or she is immediately placed, the connectivity of said individual through peer
relationships and the larger cyber-world. All these elements, and the way they re-
late to each other, change in time due to prescribed dynamics, actions taken or not
taken, and external perturbations. Certain trends are reinforced, others hampered,
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occasionally leading to irreversible or unexpected outcomes depending on the par-
ticulars of the specific individual, community or system under investigation.
Unraveling the complexities of any social or behavioral phenomenon is not an
easy task, especially when its is spread across generations, socio-economical condi-
tions and geography. When seeking for general trends, often contradictory findings
emerge due to the many factors affecting given observations that make each moment
in space and history unique. Despite the many limitations imposed by the clandes-
tine nature of extremist operatives, recent years have seen great advances in the
collection, data-mining and statistical analysis of terrorist and radical data, such as
profile lists of known extremists, databases listing terrorist attacks worldwide, the
dissecting of twitter accounts, text analysis, the cataloguing of relevant hashtags and
applying social network analysis [70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79]. Delving into
the data allows us to find features and patterns, to uncover intriguing irregularities,
and spurs our curiosity. However, seldom does it lead to the identification of the
underlying mechanisms causing the observed trends. Mathematical models offer an
alternate path. Since they are based on observations that can be described by modifi-
able dynamical processes, initial conditions and parametric variables, mathematical
models allow us to analyze the effects of individual inputs, the interplay between
them, the effects of possible feedbacks and behaviors at different time scales. By
using these inputs as building blocks, one can gradually build a nuanced understand-
ing of the complex system at hand, identify emergent behavioral or spatio-temporal
patterns, test intervention methods, identify the effects of constraints. Of course,
measurability and quantifiability remain an issue and one must never forget that al-
though useful in offering insight, no model can capture the full complexity of the
real world. A relatively new approach is to conduct laboratory experiments, whereby
participants are placed in virtual scenarios and must interactively select actions to
take. They are then polled on their intents and motivations [63, 80]. Perhaps, the fu-
ture lies in combining data-mining and other statistical analysis of compiled records
with model-building, using tools from physical and mathematical sciences.
In this work, we review recent models of radicalization where statistical physics,
complexity science, game and network theory are used to understand the multiple
aspects involved and to identify possible prevention and amelioration strategies. A
considerable body of work on mathematical models used for societal dynamics is
already present in the literature [81, 82, 83], as applied to opinion, rumor and voter
dynamics [84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91], linguistics [92], migration and crowd be-
havior [93, 94, 96], crime and conflict [97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104], gang
affiliation [105, 106, 107], social unrest [108] recidivism and rehabilitation [109],
culture dynamics [110, 111, 112, 113], human cooperation [114, 115], warfare dy-
namics [116, 117]. Here, we specifically focus on the radicalization of a cohort of
interacting individuals and on the dynamics of terrorist activity and intervention
methods.
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1.2 Radicalization in opinion dynamics models
We begin with radicalization models framed within the context of opinion for-
mation, a most natural starting point since radicals can be viewed as individuals
with extreme “opinions”. Here, the belief of an individual – and of society at large
– change through peer-to-peer contact, the influence of media, or current events.
Mean-field models assume that individuals with a given belief behave uniformly
and define a homogeneous population; each of these populations is assumed to in-
teract with others influencing their views, in a reversible or irreversible manner, so
that as time evolves the size of a given population may increase or decrease. Mathe-
matically, the dynamics is described by ODEs or, in some cases, by PDEs to include
spatial dependence. These are simplistic models, that do not take into account the
much larger complexities that lure single individuals towards fanaticism, yet they
allow for the identification of parameters or mechanisms that drive observed trends.
The work of Carlos Castillo-Chavez [118] is one of the first to introduce popula-
tion dynamics models to the study of transmission of fanatical behaviors, building
on epidemiology contact processes [119]. Concepts such as “reproduction numbers”
R0 used to predict when a disease becomes endemic (R0 > 1) and when it does not
(R0 < 1) are adapted to the spread of radical ideologies. In particular, a so called “fa-
natic hierarchy” is introduced with the total population T (t), divided into a subgroup
G(t) that has no propensity for radicalization , and three subgroups of individuals
at various stages of their commitment to the extreme ideology. The latter are S(t), a
group of susceptibles who are not yet radicalized but who are vulnerable and open
to the radical ideology at hand; the population E(t), individuals who have recently
turned into fanatics; and finally F(t) individuals who have completely espoused rad-
ical views. The various subpopulations are related by T = G+ S+E +F , and the
model is written as
dG
dt
= Λ −β1GCT + γ1S+ γ2E + γ3F−µG, (1.1)
dS
dt
= β1G
C
T
−β2S E +FC − γ1S−µS, (1.2)
dE
dt
= β2S
E +F
C
−β3E FC − γ2E−µE, (1.3)
dF
dt
= β3E
F
C
− γ3F−µF, (1.4)
where C(t) = T (t)−G(t) represents the collection of individuals who are suscep-
tible, partially or fully radicalized. The system includes a birth term Λ into the
non-susceptible population G and a death rate µ for all subpopulations, so that
dT/dt = Λ − µT , yielding T (t → ∞) = Λ/µ . All other terms in Eqs.1.1–1.4 are
associated to specific transitions between the various subpopulations. For example,
individuals of the non-susceptible population G may become receptive to radical
ideologies if exposed to them; the push of the radical message is modeled via the
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γ2E
γ3F
Λ
β1GC/T
β2S(E+F)/C β3EF/C
G S
E2 F2
γ1S
μSμG
μE2 μF2
γ2E1
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Λ
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F 2
)/C
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ρ
4 E
2 (E
1 q+
F
1 )/C
F1
β3E1F1/C
μF1
α2E2 α3F2
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1.4 Schematics of the radicalization process according to representative compartment models
[118, 120]. In panel (a) individuals may progress from a general, non-radical state G towards
a hierarchy of susceptibles S, recent adherents E and full fanatics F . Birth and death are also
included. In panel (b) two radical groups {E1,F1} and {E2,F2} can originate from the susceptible
cohort S. The two ideologies interact with adherents moving between recent convert groups E1,E2.
The parameter q < 1 indicates how effective groups are at cross-recruitment. The transition E2→
E1 is modulated by the the full radical cohort F1 and by a percentage of recent converts qE1; the
S→ E1 transition is modulated by E1 +F1 and by some members of the opposite group qE2 who
proselytize in favor of their counterparts. Similar arguments hold for E1→ E2 and S→ E2. In both
panels, T is the total population and C = T −G.
population ratio C/T < 1 modulated by the rate β1 so that the net flow G→ S is
expressed by β1GC/T . Similarly, the flow from the susceptible state into the first
stages of fanaticism S→ E depends on the indoctrination and on the example set
by the more radical individuals and is given by (E +F)/C modulated by the rate
β2. The transition from the initial radical state to the fully committed one E→ F is
instead driven solely by the radical cohort via F/C and modulated by the rate β3.
The model is summarized in Fig. 1.4(a).
Eqs.1.1–1.4 define a hierarchy in the sense that transitions through the G→ S→
E→ F stages are propelled by more radical populations influencing the lesser ones.
The three rates γi, for i = 1,2,3, represent de-radicalization from the susceptible,
recent convert, and fully fanatical subgroups, respectively. Note that there are no
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reverse intermediate transitions: radical individuals F for example may return to
the non-susceptible population G but do not transition back to their first stage of
radicalization E.
Despite its simplicity, the model in Eqs.1.1–1.4 offers useful insight on societal
outcomes, in terms of attractor points and thresholds. Of course the most impor-
tant question to ask is under which conditions does a finite fanatic population F
arise. Analysis of Eqs.1.1–1.4 shows that no level of radicalization will be sustained
(S = E = F = 0) for γ1 > β1, implying that one way to avoid radical discourse in
a society is to hamper the onset of the radical process at the early G→ S stage,
when individuals become susceptible to extremism. Depending on other parameter
combinations, attractor points with no fanatic populations (S∗ 6= 0,E = F = 0) or
(S∗ 6= 0,E∗ 6= 0,F = 0), and with fanatic populations (S∗ 6= 0,E∗ 6= 0,F∗ 6= 0) can
be identified. Equally important are the initial conditions and time scales involved:
for example, even if the steady state is predicted to yield F = 0, an initially small co-
hort of extremists can successfully invade the population and lead to a large fanatic
population over intermediate times, before it begins to decay.
Numerous studies have built upon Eqs.1.1–1.4. The possibility of two compet-
ing radical groups emanating from the same general, non-susceptible population G
has been modeled by including two recruitment rates qβ1, and (1− q)β1 feeding
into two distinct susceptible groups [120]. Each of these two cores follows the same
radicalization process illustrated in Eqs.1.1–1.4 without interacting. More interest-
ingly, the two subgroups may also experience cross-contact across the S→ E → F
hierarchy as illustrated in a different variant of the model shown in Fig. 1.4(b) Inter-
actions between the two radical branches represent recruitment competition or in-
adequate retention efforts so that fanatics may draw new adherents from converts to
the opposite ideology. Trade-offs between recruitment and retention are addressed,
and parameter regimes whereby one of the two ideologies will persist and the other
become extinct, are identified. In particular, it is shown that the two groups can-
not both coexist at steady state without cross interactions: competitive recruitment
is necessary for the emergence of two finite fanatic populations, F1,F2. Successive
studies include simplified models that focus on the recruitment process outlined in
[118, 120], that include de-radicalization treatments of extremists [121, 122], or that
parametrize government intervention [123].
Compartment models akin to [118, 120] have also been applied to actual extrem-
ist movements, for example to study the influence of separatist groups in the Basque
country of Spain [124, 125]. Subpopulations were created and transition parameters
were estimated using demographic and electoral data; immigration and emigration
terms were included as well. The ideological evolution of society was thus analyzed
over a 35-year period, including projections into the future. Eqs.1.1–1.4 were also
adapted to the study of radicalization of extreme right wing movements in Germany
[126] where Likert scale surveys repeated biannually from 2002 onwards [127, 128]
were used for calibration. In a separate study, data on ten violent extremist online
forums was collected over four years to develop a visitor-engagement model [129].
It was found that users undergo several layers of involvement until they become re-
cruiters or real-life terrorist operatives. The authors discuss strategies to control the
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proliferation of online groups, and find that aiming for the dissolution of a large
of number of extremist cyber-communities is not very effective as enforcement
costs increase but gains are limited. Targeted, occasional intervention towards large
groups is a preferable policy, as it will induce other, minor, forums to self-regulate.
Alternate compartment models define subpopulations along cultural lines, so that
responses to given societal issues may fuel radicalization in more sensitive sub-
groups [130]. Here, the core subgroup represents the mainstream; two sensitive
subgroups include first to third generation immigrants whose ways of life may be
partially incompatible with the core. Once conflict arises, core agents are assumed
to be inflexible; the sensitive subgroups may choose to adjust to mainstream be-
liefs and attitudes, or to oppose them. Three categories thus arise: core-inflexible
σI ; sensitive-peaceful, σP(t), and sensitive-opponent σO(t). The latter subgroup is
assumed to be the source of radical activity. Sensitive individuals can change their
status depending on interactions among themselves as well as with the core, accord-
ing to the following dynamics
dσP
dt
= ασI σO−βσOσP, (1.5)
dσO
dt
= −dσP
dt
, (1.6)
where the σi values, i = {I,P,O} represent subpopulation fractions so that σI +
σP(t)+σO(t) = 1. Since the core is inflexible, the value of σI is fixed. In Eqs. 1.5-
1.6 opponents recruit peaceful individuals but this process is hindered by the core
that tends to steer opponents towards the peaceful state. The authors investigate the
conditions under which a small initial minority of opponents persists, leading to
long term radicalization. Of the two steady states that arise, only one has a finite
opponent population. In particular, for a large enough core σI > β/(α+β ), oppo-
nents σO(∞)→ 0, precluding radicalization. Although Eqs. 1.5-1.6 are limited to
exchanges between segments of society and do not include institutional roles, the
results highlight that one of the ways to thwart radicalization is through core cit-
izens (σI) actively engaging with sensitive agents (σO,σP). The inflexible core σI
places this work among the many opinion dynamics models where a “zealot” frac-
tion of the population holds a fixed view that can never be changed, and where final
outcomes depend on its magnitude [88, 131].
Other compartment models have included possible catalysts for radicalization
such as unpopular political decisions or foreign interventions [132]. These may gen-
erate hatred that spreads within a population, leading to outbreaks of violence. For
example, in [132], five possible states describe societal attitudes towards a given
issue or decision; the population can be ignorant but sensitive to the topic at hand,
and once aware, immune, upset, or violent. All five groups influence each other and
contagion unfolds from an initial condition of a small upset cohort interacting with
those who are susceptible or immune to the news. After being upset and violent for
some time, individuals may accept the status quo and become relaxed. Particular at-
tention is given to the growth of the violent cohort whose ranks increase as the upset
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population interacts with the rest. Finally, compartment models have also been used
to study the internal dynamics of terrorist cells, with interacting groups of leaders
and foot-soldiers; counter-terror measures targeting both groups are also included
in the form of distinct death rates [133].
Following a slightly different approach, the emergence of two antagonistic, radi-
calized groups was modeled in [134]. Society is here assumed to host two competing
religious, ethnic or political groups, each of them harboring a moderate and a radi-
cal faction that interact with each other. Included in the model is the possibility of
one group violently attacking the other. Intra-group transitions within a sect (from
moderate to radical, and vice-versa) are assumed to occur either spontaneously or
through indoctrination, but also depend on the actions and characteristics taken by
the other sect. This is done by including a sensitivity parameter that indicates how
strongly individuals will react to external attacks or propaganda. The two A and
B sects are divided into time dependent rA(t),rB(t) radical and nB(t),nB(t) mod-
erate factions. Since the total population per sect is assumed to be constant, and
nA(t)+ rA(t) = NA and nB(t)+ rB(t) = NB, the time evolution of each sect is com-
pletely determined from the dynamics of the radical component. For sect A thus
∂ rA
∂ t
= nA
[
λAsA+ pAsA
rA
NA
−µA f (sA)rA
]
, (1.7)
while sect B follows the same dynamics with A→ B and vice-versa. The first term
on the right-hand side of Eq. 1.7 represents spontaneous radicalization described by
the intrinsic rate λA, modulated by the sensitivity parameter sA. The second term rep-
resents radicalization in response to indoctrination from the rA/NA fraction of active
radicals at rate pA, and similarly modulated by sA. De-radicalization is assumed to
occur at an intrinsic rate µA modulated by the sensitivity-dependent function f (sA).
The latter is decreases with sA so that a highly sensitive population is more un-
likely to de-radicalize. Finally, sect A is assumed to attack sect B at rate kArA, where
kA <ωB, and ωB is a maximal threshold. Coupling between the A and B sects occurs
through the sensitivity parameter sA. If this quantity is selected to be a numerical
value, the two factions are effectively uncoupled; otherwise sA = kB rB/ωANA is as-
sumed. The above relationship for sA implies that the sensitivity depends on the ratio
between the number of attacks per unit time the rB radicals actually impart on sect
A, via the term kBrB, and the hypothetical maximal attack rate sect A could inflict
on sect B in retaliation, ωANA. In this context, sensitivity is a measure of the relative
aggression capabilities of the two groups. The dynamics that unfolds from Eq. 1.7 is
rich: steady states, stability and bifurcations are determined under several scenarios
of sect size and interactiveness. A game theoretic framework [135, 136, 137, 138]
is further added, assuming that radical factions may tune “strategic” parameters,
such as intensity of propaganda λA,B or frequency of attacks kA,B to optimize given
utility functions aimed at increasing rank numbers while decreasing rival attacks.
Resources are assumed to be limited so that choices must be made between prose-
lytizing and attacking; a sect can also readjust its choices in response to the actions
taken by the other. The main finding of this work is that unless very high rates of
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violence are employed, the existence of relatively small groups of radicals cannot be
sustained: eventually, they become less extreme and only the moderate faction will
persist. The perspective that emerges is that to survive, radical groups must employ
greater violence in their early days, when they are still numerically small, and may
transition towards less violent methods, such as indoctrination of moderates, later
on, as they mature.
Finally, system dynamics approaches to understand how transnational terrorists
groups recruit new members, train and sustain them, and execute terrorist attacks
have also been introduced, in particular to study the activities of Al-Qaeda and re-
sponses from the United States [139, 140]. Non-linear behaviors are analyzed via
so called stocks and flows, feedback loops and time delays, allowing for several
scenarios to be explored through graphical user interfaces [141].
1.3 Radicalization in aging models
The mathematical models described above provide many useful insights, however
none include age-sensitive responses to propaganda, emulation of peers and societal
pressure. As described in the introduction, radicalization is highly age-dependent,
and age stratified models may help better understand the establishment and evolu-
tion of radical groups over time. A compartment model of increasingly fanatic stages
coupled to age-differentiated interactions was introduced in [143]. For simplicity,
only three cohorts are considered in this work: non-radical i = 0, activist i = 1 and
radicals i = 2 described by the densities ρi(t,a) of age a at time t for i = {0,1,2}.
Transitions between successive pools are mediated by the activation rate A(a;ρ1)
(from i = 0 to i = 1) and the radicalization rate R(a;ρ2) (from i = 1 to i = 2). Both
rates depend on the age of the source population as well as on the structure of the
sink population. A de-activation rate CD (from i = 1 to i = 0) and a pacifying rate
CP (from i = 2 to i = 1) are also included and assumed to be age-independent for
simplicity. The resulting age-structured model is of the McKendrick-von Foerster
type [144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149] and is written as
∂ρ0
∂ t
+
∂ρ0
∂a
= −A(a;ρ1)ρ0+CDρ1, (1.8)
∂ρ1
∂ t
+
∂ρ1
∂a
= A(a;ρ1)ρ0− [CD+R(a;ρ2)]ρ1+CPρ2. (1.9)
∂ρ2
∂ t
+
∂ρ2
∂a
= R(a;ρ2)ρ1−CPρ2. (1.10)
The left-hand side is the total time derivative d/dt = ∂/∂ t +(∂a/∂ t)∂/∂a; pro-
vided age and time are measured in the same units ∂a/∂ t = 1. The transition rates
that appear above are expressed as
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Fig. 1.5 Time dependence of the radical population ρ2(t) =
∫ a1
a0 ρ2(t,a)da arising from Eqs. 1.8–
1.14 under irreversible radicalization CP = 0. Radical populations oscillate defining 40-year cycles
reminiscent of Rapoport’s wave theory of modern terrorism [68]. Other parameters are a0 = 5
years, a1 = 55 years, CR = 50, CA = 12, CD = 5, αA = αR = 20 years, σA = σR = 10 years; initial
conditions are (ρ0(a,0),ρ1(a,0),ρ2(a,0)) = (0.989,0.01,0.001). Under these parameters, radical-
ization is aggressive, CR >CA >CD, and leads to a buildup of extremists ρ2(a, t) that depletes the
activist pool ρ1(t,a) until no further recruitment of the general population ρ0(t,a) is possible. The
radical cohort eventually wanes due to aging; the cycle restarts with the next generation.
A(a;ρ1) = CA
∫ a1
a0
K (a,a′;αA,σA)ρ1(t,a′)da′, (1.11)
R(a;ρ2) = CR
∫ a1
a0
K (a,a′;αR,σR)ρ2(t,a′)da′, (1.12)
where the interaction kernelsK (a,a′,α j,σ j) couple populations of different ages
K (a,a′;α j,σ j) =
[∫ a¯
−a¯
e−s
2/σ2j ds
]−1
exp
[
− (α j−a)
2+(a−a′)2
2σ2j
]
, (1.13)
for j = A,R. Although many choices are possible, as written, the interaction ker-
nels indicate that individuals are most susceptible to activation and radicalization at
target ages a= α j for j =A,R and through “peer to peer” interactions with individ-
uals of similar age but more radicalized; typical values are 20 to 30 years old. The
ranges σ j represent the effective age overlap between populations of different ages.
The overall span of radical activity is assumed to occur within the [a0,a1] window,
so that individuals of age a< a0 are too young to influence or be influenced by their
peers, while those with age a > a1 may be too old or entrenched for change. The
term a¯ ≡ a1− a0 in the prefactor of Eq. 1.13 guarantees that upon integration over
[a0,a1] the kernels are independent of σ j. Finally, boundary conditions are set as
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Fig. 1.6 Long-time radical populations of any age as a function of CA/CD and CR/CD and under
irreversible radicalization CP = 0, for the fanatic-stage model of age-differentiated interactions
in [143]. In addition to utopia (no radicals present) and turmoil (radicals persist) an oscillatory
regime arises at steady state for large values of CR/CD with CR > CA. Here, periods of turmoil
yield to dormant phases, defining 40-year cycles in accordance with the wave theory of modern
terrorism [68] and as shown in Fig. 1.5. Other parameters are a0 = 5 years, a1 = 55 years, CD = 5,
αA = αR = 20 years, σA = σR = 10 years.
ρ1(t,a0) = ρ2(t,a0) = 0, ρ0(t,a0) = ∑
i=0,1,2
ρi(t,a1). (1.14)
The model defined by Eqs. 1.8–1.14 was first analyzed by integrating over the age
interval [a0,a1], yielding a compartment model for which steady states were de-
termined. Later the full age-dependent model was analyzed to draw comparisons.
For both versions of the model, age-independent and age-dependent, three steady
states arise: utopia (where society is solely comprised of non-radicals, ρ∗0 6= 0,
ρ∗1 = ρ
∗
2 = 0), a dormant state (with finite populations of non-radicals and ac-
tivists ρ∗0 6= 0, ρ∗1 6= 0,ρ∗2 = 0) and turmoil (where radicals are also present ρ∗0 6= 0,
ρ∗1 6= 0,ρ∗2 6= 0) . However, the respective basins of attraction and the associated
populations differed greatly in the two formulations. For example age structure en-
hances radicalization in certain parameter regimes, effectively increasing the push
through the i = 0,1,2 hierarchy. In other cases, early age radicalization may drain
the activist pool and thwart further radicalization. The latter scenario represents the
radical ideology spreading too quickly among a few who become isolated from the
rest of society, and who are not able to effectively recruit more adherents through
peer pressure at the intermediate, activist level.
Most notably age-independent radicalization models do not display limit cycles
whereas, the model in Eqs. 1.8–1.14 allows for cyclic behavior to arise. Alternat-
ing waves of more or less radicalized individuals are observed over the course of
several generations as shown in Fig. 1.5. This result aligns with political science
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paradigms first presented by Rapoport and discussed in the introduction whereby ex-
tremist tendencies rise and fall over time like waves or ripples [68, 150, 151, 152].
Eqs. 1.8–1.14 provide possible mechanisms to explain wave-like behavior; cyclic
solutions typically arise when radicalization is aggressive (CR >CD and CR >CA)
and irreversible (CP = 0). Under these conditions the intermediate activist popula-
tion ρ1(a, t), which serves as a bridge between non-radicals and radicals, is depleted,
preventing non-radicals from even being exposed to fanatic ideals and entering the
radicalization cycle in the first place. This scenario represents radicals becoming so
extreme that they eventually alienate moderates and the general population, jeop-
ardizing their own survival. Without fresh recruits, the extremist movement fades
away due to aging. Realistic parameters result in a period of sustained radical pop-
ulations of 40 years, in agreement with Rapoport’s theory according to which ex-
tremists radicalize a generation of individuals, and when their influence fades due
to aging, the cycle of terrorism comes to an end [153]. Simulation outcomes in pa-
rameter space are displayed in Figure 1.6, showing long time radical populations of
any age as a function of CA/CD and CR/CD under irreversible radicalization CP = 0.
Small CA/CD leads to utopia; turmoil prevails at small CR/CD and large CA/CD. For
large CR/CD and intermediate CA/CD society oscillates between utopia and turmoil,
defining 40-year cycles.
In the next section we review models where an underlying structure, such as a
network or a lattice, is included. We conclude this section by noting that the work
illustrated above, as well as most sociological theories, assume a linear pathway
to radicalization and that the adoption of extreme beliefs is a necessary condition
for the execution of violent acts. Profiles of actual terrorists show that this is not
always the case [65, 154], and that some individuals holding very radical views have
opted to pursue peaceful avenues to manifest their discontent. Furthermore, social
movement theory suggests that terrorism is but a small part of a much wider array
of potential actions arising from protest movements and countercultures [155, 156].
It is thus likely that the radicalization pathway schematically represented in Fig. 1.2
can branch out towards multiple end points, of which only a subset include violence.
1.4 Lattice and network models
About fifty years ago, experiments on collective decision making revealed an un-
expected sociological phenomenon, termed group polarization. When faced with
diverse opinion or judgement possibilities, a medium-sized group of interacting in-
dividuals did not settle on a moderate, intermediate view. Rather, interactions lead
the group to find consensus on an extreme position, the one supported by its most
polarized members; such outcome was more pronounced if the topic was complex
and nuanced [157, 158]. Several theories were offered to explain this discovery in-
cluding diffusion of responsibility, persuasion, familiarization, and cultural values
[159, 160, 161]. Inspired by this work, Serge Galam and Serge Moscovici intro-
duced one of the first lattice type models applied to social decision making with the
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Fig. 1.7 Radicalization processes on a square lattice. At t = 0 opinions φ are heterogeneously
distributed and one radical element ρ 6= 0 is present at the center of the lattice. Parameter choices
lead to three different possible scenarioes. In panel (a) under high tolerance for different opinions,
views are still heterogeneous but no radicals emerge; this is the perpetual calm scenario. In panel
(b) tolerance is at intermediate values: the initial radical is able to nucleate a cohort of other ex-
tremists that at t→∞will cover the entire lattice; this is a seeded nucleation event. Finally, in panel
(c) individuals are intolerant to different views and clusters of radicals emerges throughout the lat-
tice; this is the spontaneous radicalization case. Under perpetual calm, the radical seed is unable
to radicalize anyone else; under seeded radicalization, a radical population spreads out from the
initial radical through nearest-neighbor interactions. Under spontaneous radicalization, individuals
radicalize even in the absence of direct contact with other radicals. Figure taken from Ref. [165]
aim of describing group polarization [162]. Their model is reminiscent of a classical
Ising model for spontaneous magnetization, where entropy, couplings, temperature
are given sociological interpretations. Individuals are assigned a spin-type opinion
value of ±1 and interact on a square lattice in the presence of site-dependent social
fields Si that exert a non-uniform pressure. Neighboring sites may thus intrinsically
favor different spin values, but the spin-spin couplings may drive them towards a
consensus. Beyond their nearest neighbors, individuals can also interact with groups
of others; the size of these groups is fixed by a given parameter, and these interac-
tions are included in the social field. The authors find that smaller interacting groups,
with less vigorous spin-spin couplings, or that allow for less dissent (the low tem-
perature scenario) tend to polarize or “break the symmetry”, whereas larger or more
tolerant groups (the high temperature scenario) yield a more moderate consensus.
Not only was this work one of the first to study the shaping of extreme opinions on
a square lattice, the results obtained also showed the importance of the underlying
fabric of social contact (couplings and interaction group size) in determining the
spread and persistence of extreme opinions. This is especially true of radical behav-
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ior where small fringe groups, or even a single individual, are able to influence large
segments of society depending on delivery methods and persuasion levels, but also
on their connectivity. In order to go beyond compartment models thus, one must
include for structured interactions between people or communities.
Several extensions of the above work to model radicalization on a square lat-
tice were proposed [163, 164, 165]. Typically, agents interact with their neighbors
and to go through a progression of stages that take them through various levels of
extremism. In Ref. [165] opinions define a continuous variable φ between ±1, al-
lowing for neutral (φ ∼ 0) and polarized (φ = ±1) views to coexist. An individual
with an extreme opinion is not necessarily a radical, since he or she may harbor a
polarizing view while still being tolerant of the opinion of others. Radicalization ρ
is here assumed to depend on how an agent responds to views that diverge from
its own. Each individual on the lattice is thus subject to a tension that depends on
the difference between its opinion and that of its nearest neighbors; reactions are
modulated by a tolerance level, so that under large enough tension and low toler-
ance, individuals become radicalized. Simulation outcomes are shown in Figure 1.7.
Under high tolerance a non-polarizing consensus is reached and no radicals exist,
akin to the emergence of an average opinion in compartment models. This is the
perpetual calm scenario of Fig. 1.7(a). When individuals are intolerant to opinion
heterogeneity, radicals may spontaneously emerge, as depicted in the spontaneous
radicalization panel in Fig. 1.7(c). Finally, under intermediate levels of tolerance,
only if the lattice has been originally nucleated with a radical element will further
radicals appear, once more underlying the importance of initial conditions. This is
the seeded radicalization case of Fig. 1.7(b).
Although not without controversy, it is believed that typical social interactions
such as the World Wide Web define scale-free networks, where the probability dis-
tribution f (k) for a node to have k links to others follows a power law f (k) ∼ k−γ
[166, 167, 168, 169, 170]. Here, γ measures how well-connected the network is;
typical ranges are 2 ≤ γ ≤ 3. In a scale-free network a few nodes have many con-
nections, the majority have only a few, and there is no sharp boundary between these
two possibilities. Scale-free networks have been used to study the spread of ideolo-
gies, for example through voter models [171, 172]. Here each node represents an
individual that carries a 0 or 1 opinion that adjusts depending on the opinion of the
nodes it is connected to. These interactions often lead to consensus, where a single
opinion permeates the entire graph. To account for scenarios where conflict arises,
such as in political debate, “zealots” are introduced similarly as to what discussed
in Eqs. 1.5-1.6. These stubborn players never change their attitudes and allow for
distinct opinions to persist [173, 174, 175]. Other types of networks to study how
cascades of extreme views can percolate throughout society have also been con-
sidered [176, 177, 178]. In particular, small-world network models of interacting,
stubborn nodes have also been shown to allow for radical views to persist; demo-
graphic surveys conducted on religious perspectives and on the state of the economy
in different countries are consistent with model outcomes [178].
The radicalization progression first proposed by [118] and modeled by Eqs.1.1–
1.4 was adapted to two scale-free networks with γ = 3. The two cases considered
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are a hierarchical network with directed connections, and a symmetric network
[179, 180]. Both are built by starting with four completely connected nodes of ex-
tremists F to which newcomers are progressively added; the original nodes influence
the attitudes of others but can also spontaneously return to the general population
G. The level of extremism of each added node depends on the attitudes held by its
neighbors mimicking a G→ S→E→F progression as originally proposed in [118].
In the hierarchical network the attitudes of recently added nodes are influenced by
those with more seniority, but the opposite is not true resulting in a history depen-
dent interactivity that represents groups with a rigid command-like structure. The
symmetric network is more flexible so that all nodes mutually influence each other,
regardless of when they joined. The question is: to what degree will the original
four fanatics influence incoming nodes? What was found is that at steady state the
hierarchical network is populated by a uniform non-radical population made of G
individuals, although cohorts of low or moderate extremists, the S and E groups, can
spread to large numbers before vanishing. In this case, the four original fanatics set
an avalanche in motion that can persist for a long time, but that eventually dissipates.
This result is compatible with findings from the compartment model [118] where
a sufficiently large de-radicalization rate γ1 yields a non-radical society at steady
state. However, under the same initial conditions and for a subset of γ1 parameters
the symmetric network yields a much different scenario: at steady state comparable
numbers of G,S,E,F nodes arise, showing that the mutual reinforcement of atti-
tudes, which is not possible in the hierarchical network, greatly increases the spread
and persistence of fanatic ideals. Behaviors on the square lattice and comparisons
with the compartment model are also discussed [179]. These results confirm that
connectivity structures and hierarchies can greatly influence the spread of extreme
attitudes, as already shown for other epidemic phenomena evolving on networks of
different types [168].
Networks used to study the evolution of diseases [181, 182] were later adapted
to to describe the spread of radical religious ideologies [183]. Here, N nodes are
distributed in space at random so that each pair is separated by a socio-spatial dis-
tance d, which represents affinity, friendship or family closeness. The distance d
also determines whether nodes are linked or not: connections are established proba-
bilistically drawing from a half-gaussian distribution P(d;D) of width D so that the
average number of connections per node is fixed at given 〈n〉 and so that the aver-
age distance on the connected network is proportional to D, 〈d〉 ∼ D. When three
nodes make a three-way connection to form a triangle, they are considered “clus-
tered”; the cluster coefficient C of a network is defined as the average number of
such triangles per node, over the maximal number of possible triangles that can be
constructed through it. As shown in Figure 1.8(a), small D yields tight clusters of
nodes with shorter links among them (large C, small 〈d〉) , large D results in more
global connections with relationships established across larger distances (small C,
large 〈d〉) [181]. Once constructed, a radicalization process akin, but not identical,
to the G→ S→ E → F sequence introduced in Eqs.1.1–1.4 is imposed on the net-
work. One of the main differences with respect to the original compartment model
in [118], is that here fanatics are further divided in two classes: foot-soldiers RS
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Fig. 1.8 Examples of networks where nodes are separated by a random distance d and links are
probabilistically established drawing from a half-gaussian distribution P(d;D) ∼ e−d2/2D2 . Here,
N = 300 and the average number of connections per node is set at 〈n〉= 8. In panel (a) where D= 1
the average distance between nodes 〈d〉 is less than in panel (b) where D = 10. The clustering co-
efficient C is defined as the average over all nodes of the number of locally connected triangles
through a given node, divided by the maximal number of possible triangles the given node can be
part of. In panel (a) C = 0.15, in panel (b) C = 0.015 revealing that clusters are more tightly con-
nected for lower values of D. These networks were originally used to study tuberculosis epidemics;
later, a G→ S→ E→ F radical progression was implemented on them to study extremism. Figure
taken from Ref. [182].
and leaders RL which are associated to higher mortality rates due to, for example,
suicide bombings, counter-terrorism attacks or arrests. Each node i is assigned an
intrinsic ideology receptiveness τi ≤ 1 and a radicalization state G,S,E,F so that
progression along the hierarchy occurs with a probability 1− (1− τi)k where k is
the number of radical neighbors of node i. Finally, the network is quasi-static in the
sense that its structure changes only due to death whereby nodes are removed and
later reintroduced randomly, rearranging links. Simulations run on 1250 nodes, of
which 10% at t = 0 were fanatics and the remainder part of the general, non-radical
population reveal that a sufficiently large initial number of fanatics can drive the
core population to radicalism before extinction.
Other modeling work considers networks where nodes carry a belief Bi and are
connected only if they are in close geographical proximity and their beliefs are simi-
lar. These two elements model homophily, the phenomenon of being drawn to those
similar to oneself. Nodes adapt the average opinion of their neighbors depending
on a spread parameter α , and on an intrinsic node vulnerability Nv; the most influ-
ential neighbors are assumed to be the ones with higher degree centrality. Finally,
once a critical belief is achieved, the node is assumed to have radicalized and will
only interact with other radicals. Apart from scale-free networks, random and small-
world networks are analyzed: vulnerability and information spread are found to be
more relevant than the underlying network structure in determining the abundance
of radical nodes [184].
Some scale-free network models have studied radicalization as extreme forms of
protest in the environmental and animal rights movements, which at times may also
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lead to violent action [185]. The two movements were analyzed together since they
share many similarities in their origin and ideals, yet display different characteris-
tics in the way activists protest. Environmentalists gravitate towards demonstrative
or confrontational actions, with radicals opting for minor attacks on property; ani-
mal rights extremists display a greater tendency to target people [186, 187]. In the
network model introduced in [185] nodes are assumed to carry a level of criminal
propensity and a susceptibility for changing their morality and self-control; these
levels evolve depending on social contacts with other nodes. Empirical data col-
lected by the authors suggests that pre-radicalized animal right extremists tend to
create sub-groups who attract more of the same; peaceful protesters instead remain
such even after joining an animal rights movement. There is no equivalent corre-
lation for environmental protesters. Activist nodes in animal right networks were
thus assumed to preferentially link to nodes with the same criminality levels; while
environmental activists forged connections with nodes of the same morality level,
mimicking homophily [188]. Among the results is that initial conditions greatly af-
fect the outcomes of activist campaigns, and that given the same initial conditions
and network configuration, the final number of criminally-minded agents in animal
rights movements is much higher than in the environmental case.
Two historical and purportedly scale-free networks were also analyzed: the
Cathar heresy in 13th century France – the first organized challenge ever faced by the
Roman Catholic Church – and the Reformation in England in the mid 16th century
that led to large scale conversions to Protestantism [189, 190]. In the first case the
network was suppressed, in the latter it successfully spread throughout England.
Although limited data was available, key players serving as network hubs were
identified in both cases [191]. By comparing the two historical outcomes, the au-
thors concluded that in order to stop extreme movements from permeating society,
it may it be more effective to isolate key players on the network by neutralizing their
close contacts, rather than risk creating cascade effects through active persecution,
or even martyrdom. The authors argue that the lessons learnt may be applicable to
our current times.
How followers are recruited or spontaneously join online extremist networks was
the subject of a detailed analysis performed on VKontakte [192]. This is a Russian-
based online social networking service, with more than 350 million subscribers,
heavily used by ISIS as a means to spread its ideology in Chechen Russia. Roughly
196 pro-ISIS self-organized online aggregates (the equivalent of Facebook groups)
were identified over an eight month period in 2015, attracting more than one hun-
dred thousand adherents. The growth and decline of the size of these aggregates was
tracked over time revealing merging and shutdowns, possibly due to government or
regulator intervention as shown in Fig. 1.9. The dynamics was then modeled as a
coagulation and fragmentation process [193] as follows
∂ns
∂ t
=
vcoal
N2
s−1
∑
k=1
k(s− k)nkns−k− 2vcoalN2 sns
∞
∑
k=1
knk−
vfrag
N
sns, (1.15)
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Fig. 1.9 Dynamics of ten pro-ISIS aggregate groups on the social network VKontakte. Horizontal
bars shows the lifespan of each of these groups; the process of appearing and disappearing is
modeled as a coagulation-fragmentation process via Eqs. 1.15 and 1.16. The inset shows a portion
of an actual aggregate-follower network on January 1st 2015 with individual followers (blue nodes)
linking to pro-ISIS aggregates (red nodes). Taken from Ref. [192].
∂n1
∂ t
= −2vcoal
N2
n1
∞
∑
k=1
knk +
vfrag
N
∞
∑
k=2
k2nk. (1.16)
Here ns(t) is the size of aggregate s so that the total number of individuals is
N = ∑s sns(t). The three terms on the right hand side of Eq. 1.15 refer respectively
to: coagulation/merger between an aggregate of size k and s− k to form a larger
one of size s; the loss of an aggregate of size s that merged with another one; the
fragmentation or loss of an aggregate due to its dissolution. Unaffiliated individuals
belong to the s = 1 aggregate. Rates of coalescence and fragmentation are given
by vcoal and vfrag respectively. Eq. 1.15 is complemented by Eq. 1.16 which models
the dynamics for an aggregate of size s = 1 and where no coalescence is possible,
since the minimum size of a coalescence process is s = 2. The two terms on the
right hand side represent respectively the merging of an s = 1 aggregate with any
other, and an increase in the number of s = 1 aggregates due to fragmentation of an
existing one. Using generating functions [194] it can be shown that at equilibrium
the size distribution of aggregates n∗s scales according to
n∗s ∼
(
νs−1coal (νcoal+νfrag)
s
(2νcoal+νfrag)2s−1
)
s−5/2. (1.17)
In the limit of large s a power-law distribution emerges n∗s ∼ s−γ where γ = 2.5,
in good agreement with the γ = 2.33 seen in observations. Eqs.1.15 and 1.16 also
allow to explore possible avenues of anti-ISIS online intervention. For example, it is
shown that an effective strategy is for anti-terrorism agencies to focus on the shutting
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down of smaller groups, before they become too potent; indeed, if the dissolution
rate vfrag is too slow, several clusters will rapidly coalesce into one super-aggregate.
Finally, the same authors used a similar coagulation-fragmentation framework to
describe the likelihood that a terrorist attack will result in a given number of vic-
tims. Richardson’s Law is a well known paradigm in political conflict, according
to which the distribution of casualties due to violence follows a power law, so that
the probability p(x) of an event with x deaths scales as p(x)∼ x−γ . The assumption
made in [195, 196, 197] is that an insurgent movement is made of various cells of
extremists, each carrying an attack strength si that represents the potential number
of casualties it will inflict. Cells are continuously rearranging their attack strengths
through coalescence and fragmentation, as described by Eqs. 1.15-1.16 so that the
probability distribution for attack strength n∗s ∼ s−γ in Eq. 1.17 can be viewed as
a proxy for the number of casualties p(x) ∼ x−γ . A convincing illustration of this
parallel is that the scaling of the number of victims due to insurgent attacks in Iraq,
Colombia and Afghanistan follows a power-law distribution, with exponents con-
sistent with the γ ∼ 2.5 estimate predicted by Eqs. 1.15-1.16.
But how exactly is a network of operational terrorists structured? How does it
change in time, due to internal dynamics, changes to the socio-political environ-
ment, the need for secrecy, technological advances, and in response to counter-terror
interventions [198]? Any progress in answering these questions may lead to a bet-
ter assessment of terrorist hierarchies, and in developing policies and practices to
best detect and disrupt them [199]. Terrorist groups function underground and their
secretive nature makes data collection challenging; to date, information has mostly
been gathered via open-source texts from the media and publicly available legal
transcripts [200]. Initial efforts to understand terrorist organizations sprung in the
early eighties, to catalogue insurgent activities in Palestine, by the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA), and covert operations by the KBG [201]. The Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks led to greater urgency in this direction; as much as possible,
data collection, social network and text analysis were used to identify emergent lead-
ers, spheres of influence, hubs, graph structures of individual cells and of extremists
frequenting web forums [4, 202, 203]. Several computer-supported techniques com-
bining network text analysis and methods to classify organizational systems or so-
cial network analysis [204] were introduced, such as the Meta-Matrix Text Analysis
[205, 206], the Dynamic Network Analysis [207, 208], the Computational Analy-
sis of Social and Organizational Systems [209] the Counter-Terror Social Network
Analysis and Intent Recognition [210]. These packages evolved over time to allow
for visual, sophisticated representations of connections of actors, locations, events,
tasks, knowledge, resources, allowing to study not just command hierarchies, but
also relationships based on economics or training. Some software also allow for the
removal of actors to forecast possible consequences to the terrorist structure [208]
after their capture or death. These features can be especially useful for diplomatic
or military considerations. One example of a network reconstructed via the Meta-
Matrix Text Analysis is shown in Fig. 1.10.
What emerges is that terrorist networks tend to display a highly centralized orga-
nization, but counter-terror pressures compel them to modify their structures and
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Fig. 1.10 An agent-by-agent Middle-East terrorist network visualized through the Meta-Matrix
Text Analysis [209]. Media outlets searched to create this graph includes major newspapers, mag-
azines, journals, trial transcripts, book excerpts, scientific articles on Al-Qaeda in Iraq from 1977
to 2004. The nodes on the left are not directly linked to other actors. The isolated, circular sub-
graph on the left side of the inner circle that is not connected to other agents represents individuals
who were charged with the Khobar Tower Bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1994. Relevant nodes were
identified: one carries the highest cognitive demand (0.0915), degree centrality (0.0915) and be-
tweenness centrality (0.0463); a distinct node has the highest clique count (12.0), and yet another
distinct node has the highest number of simmelian ties (0.0282). Taken from Ref. [206].
actions, forcing them to find compromise between security and communication
[211, 212]. Typically, leadership roles are re-adjusted and hierarchical organiza-
tions become more decentralized so that the network may survive a negative en-
vironment. This trend is observed in many networks, including in al-Muhajiroun,
a British group that advocates the establishment of an Islamic state in the country
[213]: once its leader left Britain, followers adapted their operations, created spin-
off groups, kept recruiting new members, and shifted towards online communica-
tion. A similar trend was seen in the the militant Islamic group led by Noordin Top
in Indonesia between 2000-2010: as authorities tried to disrupt the organization, its
topography changed in terms of centralization and density [214, 215]. Similarly, Al-
Qaeda abandoned its initial corporate-like command structure in favor of a so-called
leaderless jihad [216] due to increasing scrutiny after the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks. These organizational changes are also confirmed by the text analysis methods
described above [208], where over the course of a decade, the density and communi-
cation levels within Al-Qaeda cells were seen to decrease. An evolutionary process
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to describe Al-Qaeda’s path from a tightly coupled organization, to a coupled net-
work, to loosely coupled movement is illustrated in [217]. Furthermore, in its post
September 11th incarnation, Al-Qaeda has been described as a “dune-like” orga-
nization [218, 219] whereby its affiliates are encouraged to operate independently
while still part of its broader network. Among the many drawbacks to this tactic is
that rebel groups may splinter and antagonize the once centralized command. This
is the genesis of present-day ISIS that began as part of the umbrella of organiza-
tions under Al-Qaeda’s influence, but that rapidly emerged as one of its strongest
contenders.
Since the few, but well connected, nodes typical of scale-free networks may jeop-
ardize the operational security of terrorist cells, it is important to understand which
organizational structures best serve covert organizations. The tradeoff between op-
erational efficiency and secrecy in terrorist networks was analyzed in [220] where
various models of communication on connected graphs were compared and con-
trasted under different detection risk scenarios. In this work, each node i of a g
graph is characterized by a degree di. The total number of nodes is n and the total
number of links is m. First, a communication measure I(g) is defined based on the
connectivity of the graph
I(g) =
n(n−1)
∑i j `i j(g)
, (1.18)
where `i j is the shortest distance between nodes i and j, and n(n−1)/2 is the number
of pairs in a network of n nodes. The quantity I(g) can be thought of as the normal-
ized reciprocal of the total distance and as a result 0 ≤ I(g) ≤ 1. Since `i j → ∞ for
unconnected nodes, I(g)→ 0 for a disjoined graph; I(g) = 1 on a fully connected
graph. Two factors are assumed to contribute to the security of node i: the exposure
probability of being identified as member of the network, αi, and the fraction of
the network that remains unexposed after a given node has been detected, ui. The
overall likelihood of the network remaining unexposed is thus given by
S(g) =∑
i
αiui. (1.19)
An optimal graph is one that maximizes the product of the information I(g) and
secrecy S(g) measures, µ(g) = S(g)I(g). The first scenario analyzed is that of a
uniform exposure probability αi = 1/n and where if node i is identified as part of
the network, all others connected to it become exposed with a link detection prob-
ability p, so that ui = (n− pdi− 1)/n. Here, p = 1 represents the case where all
links are exposed; p = 0 indicates an impenetrable network where the identifica-
tion of one node still allows for the other n−1 to remain unknown to counter-terror
agents. The other scenario is that of node detection being proportional to its cen-
trality in the network, αi = (di + 1)/(2m+ n) and where a detected node leads to
all its connections being exposed ui = (n−di−1)/n. Game theoretic Nash bargain-
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(c) (d)
Fig. 1.11 Structures of covert graphs leading to the maximal information and secrecy measure
µ(g) = I(g)S(g) defined via Eqs. 1.18-1.19. In Eq.1.19 node detection is proportional to its cen-
trality in the network, αi = (di+1)/(2m+n), and full exposure upon detection ui = (n−di+1)/n
is assumed. Panel (a) shows the optimal graphs for n = 2 through n = 7, and panel (b) displays
approximate optimal graphs obtained via simulations for n = 8,9,10. Different optimal structures
arising from different information measures are shown in the lower panels. Using the same αi,ui
as in panels (a) and (b), panel (c) shows approximate optimal graphs for n = 25 and n = 40 under
I(g) given by Eq. 1.18, whereas in panel (d) I2(g) = 1/D(g) is used for the same number of nodes,
n = 25 and n = 40 and where D(g) = max{i, j}∈g `i j is the diameter of the network. Taken from
Ref. [220].
ing is then used to determine which g structure leads to maximal µ(g) for small
values of n [221, 222]; simulations are used in the case of larger n, where µ(g) is
explicitly evaluated over multiple configurations and the maximum value recorded.
In the first case, if the link detection probability is high, p→ 1, the Nash bargaining
solution is a star graph. As the link detection probability p is decreased, a transi-
tion is observed and a complete graph becomes best. In the second case, cellular
networks such the ones shown in Figs. 1.11(a)–(c) are optimal. As a result, optimal
covert networks should incorporate all-to-all communication when detection risks
are low; a star configuration when communications can be intercepted but nodes
are equivalent; reinforced rings, wheels and other cellular structures if centrality is
important. Other choices of I(g) may lead to different optimal graphs; for exam-
ple in Fig. 1.11(d) best structures are shown if the communication measure is set
at I2(g) = 1/D(g) where D(g) is the diameter of the graph defined as the maximal
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distance among all nodes, D(g) = max{i, j}∈g `i j. Among the many variants of this
work, one of the most notable is the inclusion of node heterogeneity where a specific
interaction between a pair of nodes may be riskier that others. In this case network
structure is optimized by having the pair in question being the least connected to
the remainder of the network. This theoretical framework was later applied to the
2002 Bali attacks by Jemaah Islamiya, an Indonesian Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist
group, for which prior knowledge of operational and command nodes was known
[203]. Links were assigned heterogeneous weights representing different risk levels.
The optimal networks for n = 25 and n = 40 consist of cellular structures around a
centralized individual, less dense than those observed in Fig. 1.11(c) since the high
risk link carries limited connectivity to the remainder of the network [220, 223].
The structure of actual operative cells that attacked five South East Asia locations
and Madrid, Spain was analyzed in Ref. [204]. What was found is that all terrorist
networks became increasingly dense and cohesive as they prepared for executing
the above attacks; these networks did not display scale-free characteristics, nor did
they seem to reorganize much to optimize communication secrecy. This has led
to the interesting theory that as they ready for action, and especially if they oper-
ate under a sense of security, terrorist groups will not devote resources to optimize
their internal structure, as it would distract from their main objective, which is to
attack. It is only the threat of detection and the need for covertness that catalyzes
changes to existing patterns, since links that were forged over time, not necessarily
in an organic way and connecting individuals with different ideals, skills and per-
sonalities, require costly, time-consuming intervention to rearrange. As a corollary,
it is suggested that a possible counter-terrorism strategy could be to foster a false
sense of security, allowing for connections to densify over time so that once inter-
vention occurs the maximal number of members of the network will be exposed.
The same authors propose that rather than eliminating hubs of well-connected in-
dividuals hoping that the network will collapse, a better strategy in the absence of
a scale-free structure, or in the presence of networks that regenerate themselves, is
to employ enough resources to target the entire terrorist cell. The case of terrorists
organized in a clique of N nodes, that is a graph where every two nodes are di-
rectly connected, has been analyzed in [224]. Because of the structure of a clique,
the capture of any of its members would expose all. If detection probability is set
at p per link, percolation theory allows to estimate that cliques of size N ≥ 1/2p2
will be detected with high probability. This non-linear outcome suggests that any
investment to increase surveillance to p would translate to capture rewards of order
p2; seen from a different perspective this result implies that to avoid detections, as
p is increased, cliques must shrink by p2 members. Other work addresses the ques-
tion of how hierarchical terrorist groups would function when crucial members are
captured or killed [225] and advocates for searching network cut-sets, that is nodes
whose removal disconnects leaders from followers.
The organizational dynamics of the Global Salafi Jihad (GSJ) terrorist group,
a Muslim revivalist movement, was studied between 1989 and 2003 using open
source information [226]. Results from this test case were consistent with the dy-
namical changes described above: the network was observed to be rather random at
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the onset, but acquired a scale-free topology as new members joined while others
left, due to the pressure from counter-terrorism operations. Average degree, degree
distribution and network diameter, defined as the average length of the shortest path
between any pair of nodes, were used as statistical measures. Furthermore, vulner-
ability to random failures, targeted attacks, and counter-terrorism efforts were all
analyzed by simulating node removal; the loose network was found to be resilient
to all disruption efforts.
The Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agent (SOMA) was originally developed
to understand how social, economics or religious communities behave; later it was
specifically applied to terrorist organizations [227, 228, 229]. Datasets tracking re-
bellion and protest movements worldwide are mined to generate rules of behavior
for known violent ethno-political or ethno-nationalist groups [230, 231]. These rules
are associated to given actions such as kidnapping or orchestrating transnational at-
tacks, and to various environmental characteristics, such as receiving financial or
military support from a foreign country. From the data, one can then reconstruct
likelihoods for a given organization to execute a given action under given condi-
tions. This is valuable since the number of action-condition combinations is very
large and a human analyst could easily miss an interesting hypothesis. Hezbollah
for example was tracked for 23 years and one finding is that when involved in lo-
cal inter-organizational conflicts, it is less likely to engage in transnational violence
[232]. Hamas was also studied [233] and appears to especially engage in violent
activities when providing social services to Palestinians; its kidnapping rate of Is-
raeli citizens also increases at times of heightened conflict with Fatah, its major
rival in the area. Other contexts in which SOMA-rules were applied include under-
standing the behavior of actors in the Afghan drug economy [234] and of separatist
movements in the Jammu and Kashmir provinces of India and Pakistan [235]. These
findings do not explain why certain correlations are observed, however they are still
useful as they pose new questions, offer new hypothesis and food for thought.
The topological role of women in terrorist organizations is explored in [236];
data mining performed on the social media outlet VKontakte and on offline records
detailing the 1970-1988 activity of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
show that in both organizations women occupy nodes with superior network con-
nectivity, guaranteeing robustness and survival to the network itself [236]. Between-
ness centrality is a good indicator to measure how influential a given node is in a
network; it is defined as the fraction of shortest paths connecting any two nodes that
pass through a given node. In a network of covert extremists, understanding shortest
path features is especially relevant, since adding any extra step to connect players
represents risk and potential cost. The analysis in [236] shows that betweenness
centrality on female nodes is much higher than on male nodes. The high intercon-
nectivity of women implies that play important roles as communicators of messages
and goods; it would be interesting to include this feature into future dynamical mod-
els of terrorist networks.
Finally, in order to succeed when planning and executing attacks, terrorist groups
may require the support of passive sympathizers who ensure secrecy and offer logis-
tical support. This aspect of terrorism has been studied through percolation models
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on lattices [237, 238, 239] where if the number of sympathizers exceeds the perco-
lation threshold, the terrorist operation is deemed likely to succeed. A social dimen-
sion is included via socioeconomic, political, or religious discontent through which
individuals establish connections. Within this framework, for a given number of
sympathizers, thwarting attacks crucially depends on raising the percolation thresh-
old; the authors find that this can be achieved upon decreasing connectivity between
individuals, or by reducing the social dimension that ignites it. Governments that do
not wish to imprison passive sympathizers, nor restrict the social connectivity of its
citizens, may instead opt to disentangle intricate societal issues so that they do not
unite large numbers of dormant, unconnected sympathizers. At the most they will
form local, unconnected clusters.
1.5 Game theoretic models of terrorism
In previous sections we discussed the radicalization of individuals, and how new
recruits join terrorist organizations. We also reviewed the social structures of ter-
rorist networks that facilitate communication while evading detection, and how
various cells may merge or dissipate. All these human and material resources de-
termine the organizational capability of a terrorist organization; whether such ca-
pabilities translate into a successful execution however, depends on how extrem-
ists interface with existing deterrents. Before striking, terrorist organizations must
rationally weigh their probability for success, and evaluate their expected gains
against potential costs and the risk of being exposed. Attacks may thus be exe-
cuted in the immediate, postponed to future times, or aborted. The process of ra-
tional decision making is best explored through the tools of game theory. Aerial
hijacking and hostage taking incidents, which were commonplace in the eighties,
were among the first terrorist incidents to be described via game theoretic mod-
els [240, 241, 242, 243, 244]. Despite the fanatical ideologies involved, negotiat-
ing strategies and reactions involving terrorists and counter-terrorism agents were
found to be remarkably rational. This was interpreted as a consequence of both
sides seeking to predict future developments in volatile situations, so as to avoid
unexpected occurrences [245]. More recently, differential games have been used to
model the dynamics between terrorist organizations and government authorities, in
an attempt to estimate the risk of terrorist attacks and to assess prevention strategies
[246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256].
Differential terrorism games originate from dynamical compartment models
[257, 258]: extremists and governmental counter-terror agencies adjust the inten-
sity of their activities as they interact with each other and other sociopolitical en-
tities, seeking the most favorable outcome. The strength of a terrorist organization
is described by a scalar state variable x(t)≥ 0, which represents one or a combina-
tion of resources the organization possesses, such as number of recruits, weapons,
supporters from the general public, financial capital, knowledge and access to new
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technologies [247, 248, 259]. The state variable x evolves over time as follows
[251, 253, 255, 256]
dx
dt
= I(x;u)−O(x;u) = C (x;u), (1.20)
where I and O represent the influx (accumulation) and the outflux (consumption) of
resources, respectively, and u(t) denotes an array of time-dependent control param-
eters that reflect strategy adjustments of both terrorists and governmental agencies.
The influx term I is typically assumed to be independent of external circumstances
and to grow linearly at rate r, I(x) = rx [253, 255, 256]. Some models include a
carrying capacity on the amount of resources an organization can maintain, and
adopt a logistic growth I(x) = rx(xmax−x), where xmax specifies the maximum pos-
sible resource [248]. A constant influx is sometimes included to “jump start” the
model and usually set to a very small value [250, 252]. Further dependence on the
control parameters u may be included. For example, an overly aggressive counter-
terrorism policy may antagonize the general public, boosting public support for
terrorist groups, and favor the recruitment of new members [247, 248, 250]. The
most simplistic assumption is for the outflux term O to depend on a two-component
control parameter u(t) = (u1(t),u2(t)) where u1(t) ≥ 0, u2(t) ≥ 0 represent the
intensities of terrorist activities and anti-terrorism operations, respectively, so that
[253, 255, 256]
O(x;u) = h(u1,u2). (1.21)
The function h is referred to as a “harvest”; it specifies the consumption and loss of
terrorist resources due to attack executions, arrests, foiled attacks, and other events.
It is typically assumed that ∂h/∂ui > 0 for i = 1,2 and for all ui values, so that
increases in terrorist and governmental activity result in increases to the harvesting
of resources. Further assumptions are made on the second-order partial derivatives
of h: ∂ 2h/∂u21 > 0 indicates that as the intensity of terrorist activities increases, the
consumption of resources further intensifies; ∂ 2h/∂u22 < 0 indicates that as he inten-
sity of anti-terrorism activity increases, terrorist resource consumption increases at a
slower rate. The underlying idea behind this assumption is that as counter-terrorism
measures intensify, decreased gains are to be expected in terms of losses to terror-
ists. Finally, ∂ 2h/(∂u1∂u2) ≥ 0 indicating that increased attack intensities lead to
greater anti-terrorism operations, whereas increased anti-terrorism activities will in-
crease terrorist consumption of resources. Lastly, h satisfies the boundary conditions
limui→0 h(ui,u j)→ 0, and limui→∞ h(ui,u j)→ ∞ for i, j = 1,2. These are known as
the Inada conditions [260]: there is no spending of resources if there are no terrorist
attacks nor any anti-terrorism measures in place; when either terrorists or govern-
mental agencies strongly increase their activities, the harvest of resources becomes
infinitely large. Some models include natural attrition to the outflux of resources,
such as departure of personnel and expiration of supplies, which limits resource
growth [252]. Both terrorists and anti-terrorism authorities aim to maximize given
utility functions by varying their respective control parameters ui for i = 1,2 under
the constraints given by Eq. 1.20. The terrorist utility function is written as
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J1(T ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρ1t [αx(t)+βu1(t)]dt+ e−ρ1T [αx(T )+βu1(T )] . (1.22)
Eq. 1.22 implies that terrorists benefit from increasing resources x and attack intensi-
ties u1; α > 0 and β > 0 define their relative weights, respectively. The exponential
pre-factor indicates that resources and attack capabilities decay in time at rate ρ1. It
is important to note that ρ1 ≤ r leads to unrealistic scenarios, whereby the best strat-
egy for the terrorist group is to accumulate resources and capabilities ad infinitum
without ever attacking. Hence ρ1 > r is always implicitly assumed. The termination
time T > 0 specifies the time horizon over which the optimization game is to be con-
ducted. For example, T may be a presidential term if the terrorist organization aims
to undermine the incumbent administration; incumbents may instead seek political
capital through counter-terrorism measures as they strategize for the next electoral
cycle [248]. If no specific timeframe is considered, T → ∞, so that the second term
in Eq. 1.22 vanishes. Governmental agencies seek to maximize the loss of terrorist
resources, the h(u1,u2) harvest, and to minimize x and u1 using as little effort u2 as
possible. These assumptions leads to the following government utility function
J2(T ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρ2t [γh(u1(t),u2(t))−κx(t)−σu1(t)−ηu2(t)]dt
+e−ρ2T [γh(u1(T ),u2(T ))−κx(T )−σu1(T )−ηu2(T )] , (1.23)
where γ > 0, κ > 0, σ > 0, and η > 0 are constant weights. Just as for J1(T ),
in order for realistic scenarios to emerge ρ2 > r: if this condition is not obeyed,
the best strategy for governmental agencies would be to allow extremists to keep
accumulating resources and attack capability, which is undesirable.
The simplest scenario is to assume that both terrorist organization and authori-
ties do not wait for each other’s actions to establish their own tactics. The model
is thus an open-loop game. To proceed, for simplicity, one can let T → ∞ so that
J1 =
∫ ∞
0 j1(t)dt where j1(t) = e
−ρ1t(αx(t) + βu1(t)); similarly for J2. To calcu-
late the optimal u(t) under the constraint given by Eq. 1.20 a Lagrangian function
L1(x,λ1,u, t) is derived by extending the J1 payoff to incorporate the constraint.
This is done through a continuum of Lagrange multipliers λ1(t) resulting in
L1 =
∫ T
0
j1(t)+λ1(t)(C (x;u)− x˙(t))dt. (1.24)
The quantity H1(x,λ ,u, t) = j1(t)+λ1(t)C (x;u) is referred to as the Hamiltonian;
the corresponding H2(x,λ2,u, t) can be derived for the utility J2, subject to the same
constraint. Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle the optimal control u= (u1,u1)
and the optimal trajectory x(t) can be found by minimizing the H1,H2 Hamiltoni-
ans [261]. The resulting Nash equilibria depend on the form of the harvest function
h(u1,u2): if h increases at a relatively steep rate as a function of u1, the optimal
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strategy is for terrorists to attack less and u1 is kept low; if counter-terrorism opera-
tions strongly affect terrorist activity, the best strategy for governmental agencies is
to increase u2.
In more realistic settings, one side observes the actions of the other and adjusts
its strategy accordingly, For example, the terrorist organization may secretly observe
how the government deploys its resources before choosing whether and which target
to attack; similarly once counter-terrorism measures are in place, authorities may
wait for terrorist organizations to strike first, and later adjust their responses. When
one player is a leader and the other is a follower in a two-player game, the model is
a closed-loop Stackelberg competition, for which sub-game perfect Nash equilibria
may exist [262]. Such equilibria can be found by solving the optimal strategy of
the follower u∗F as a function of the leader’s uL; the leader determines its optimal
strategy u∗L accordingly. Note that the Hamiltonians are different in the open-loop
and in the Stackelberg games.
Regardless of which player takes on the role of the leader, the Stackelberg game
always results in higher payoffs to the leader than in the open-loop game. This sig-
nifies that, given the same circumstances and model parameters, a good strategy
for either terrorists or anti-terrorism agencies is to be proactive and act first. When
terrorists are the leaders, both groups act more cautiously than in the open-loop sce-
nario, there are fewer terrorist attacks and fewer counter-terrorism operations, but
more resourceful terrorists at the end of the game [253]. If governmental agencies
are the leaders, optimal strategies on both sides depend on σ , the weight assigned
to u1 in Eq. 1.23. This quantity can be interpreted as the damage inflicted on gov-
ernmental assets per terrorist attack. For relative small σ , x(t) becomes negative
at long times, and a Nash equilibrium does not exist. For moderate σ , when dam-
ages inflicted are modest, the equilibrium u2 value is smaller, and u1 larger than in
the open-loop game: counter-terrorism agencies are more guarded, and this allows
terrorists to accumulate more resources. Finally, for large σ , when attacks are on
a larger scale, the equilibrium u2 is larger and the equilibrium u1 is smaller in the
Stackelberg than in the open-loop game: counter-terrorism agencies are more proac-
tive in preventing these large scale attacks, and extremists become more cautious.
Eq. 1.20 may be extended to explicitly include public support of the government,
which may grow in time, decrease due to terrorist attacks, or be boosted by success-
ful anti-terrorism operations [255]. The two players may also play a zero-sum game,
where one seeks to minimize the payoff of the other, rather than maximize its own
utility [256].
Excessively aggressive anti-terrorism tactics that can alienate public opinion and
increase support for terrorist organizations have also been investigated [248]. Here,
I(x;u) is augmented by Iant(x;u) ∝ u2(t)2, representing unintended advantages that
government efforts yield to terrorists, limiting their own intervention capability. In
most scenarios, a perpetual tug emerges between the two parties: by provoking au-
thorities to respond overaggressively, terrorist attacks may self-sustain themselves
despite the large consumption of resources, and a cycle of violence emerges. This
scenario is avoided if the proper values of α,β are selected in Eq. 1.22, in particu-
lar if the terrorist group is more interested in the collection of resources (large α),
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and less in the execution of attacks (low β ). It is thus suggested that governmental
agencies should attempt to influence terrorists to pursue political goals rather than
conduct destructive acts; this shift may also emerge naturally as extremist groups
mature. Historically, many former terrorist organizations did transition into legiti-
mate political parties, and at least to some degree renounced violent methods. Well
known examples include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), and at least partially, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas in the Middle East. This conclusion is
similar to what observed in Ref. [134] and discussed in Section 1.2, where using
a different game-theoretic mathematical framework, it was shown that the optimal
strategy for a small radical faction to grow after having established itself through
violence, is to gradually disengage from it and focus on indoctrination.
The effects of government authorities applying negative (“sticks”) and positive
(“carrots”) counter-terrorism incentives is analyzed in [249] under the assumption
that negative incentives may be detrimental causing, for example, the emergence of
hatred in the local population. A related “fire or water” model was also developed
whereby two different anti-terrorism strategies can affect the strength of a terrorist
group 0≤ x≤ 1 [250]. Fire strategies to contrast x are cheaper, more aggressive, and
more effective but less precise; they are also more controversial and may indirectly
advantage terrorist groups. Water strategies are less invasive, precise and surgically
planned, and remove terrorist threats without antagonizing the general public. They
are also assumed to be less effective and more costly than fire strategies. The objec-
tive of anti-terrorist authorities is to minimize terrorist strength x, as well as expen-
ditures for water u and fire v strategies; reactions from terrorists and related costs
are disregarded. As a result, σ = γ = 0 in 1.23 so that terrorist responses u1 and the
harvest h are not included in the expression for the J2 government utility function.
Fig. 1.12(a) shows that as x increases, the optimal intensity of fire strategies v∗ also
increases, signifying that stronger terrorist groups require more vigorous interven-
tion. The optimal water intervention u∗ stays instead relatively constant. For x large
enough however, the dynamics of the system leads terrorist strength towards a finite
non zero Nash equilibrium x→ xE. Since payoff functions aim to minimize terrorist
activities but also government expenses, eradication of the extremist groups does
not necessarily yield the optimal utility. Fire tactics are thus best suited when the
initial strength of the terrorist organization is larger than its equilibrium, x > xE,
since they will lead to a partial weakening of the extremist group. A second equilib-
rium xD emerges for very small values of x, with xD xE as shown in Fig. 1.12(b).
Here, for x ≤ xD, the corresponding optimal water strategy u∗ drives x→ 0, com-
pletely eliminating terrorist activities. A discontinuity in u∗ arises at x = xD with
two distinct values for optimal payoff: the higher one, for x→ x−D leads to x→ 0;
the lower one for x→ x+D results in x→ xE. Also note that for x smaller than a given
threshold, x< xS, the optimal fire strategy v∗→ 0, suggesting when terrorists are not
very resourceful, water strategies are the sole optimal way to completely eliminate
terrorism.
Citizen approval of anti-terrorism operations is introduced to the model defined
in [252] through an additional state variable y(t) that represents support from the
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Fig. 1.12 Optimal control values of water u∗ (solid line) and fire v∗ (dashed line) counter-terrorism
strategies as functions of terrorist strength 0≤ x≤ 1, Two non-zero equilibria xE and xD arise. Panel
(a) shows the emergence of the Nash equilibrium value xE, so that for x> xE fire strategies weaken
terrorist activity whereas for x < xE they embolden them. Panel (b) shows the magnified range
0 ≤ x ≤ 0.1 where the other equilibrium value xD  xE lies. Here, two optimal water strategies
u∗ with identical optimal payoff exist: the low-level one for x→ x+D leads to intensified terrorist
strength so that x→ xE, whereas the high-level one for x→ x−D results in eradication of terrorist
activity with x→ 0. The vertical dotted line denoted by xS indicates the critical terrorist strength
below which optimal fire strategies v∗ → 0, suggesting that the optimal way to counter initially
weak terrorist groups is to use only water strategies. Taken and modified from Ref. [250].
general public. This quantity increases as terrorist organizations grow their re-
sources x, but decreases under aggressive counter-terrorism operations
dy
dt
= ryx−ωu22+ζ (ymax− y), (1.25)
where ry is rate of public support, ω describes antagonistic effects due to overag-
gressive counter-terrorism initiatives, and ζ specifies the rate of y converging to a
maximum ymax under neutral conditions. Higher public approval is also modeled to
increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations, as it may lead to larger
budgetary means to combat extremism, or even in active participation in seeking
fugitives or reporting suspicious activities. A y-dependence is thus introduced to the
harvest function h(y,u1,u2), such that ∂h/∂y> 0 for x,u1,u2 > 0. Multiple equilib-
ria are found depending on parameter choices. In one case, the optimal scenario is
the counter-terrorism authority enjoying public support and effectively suppressing
terrorism; in the opposite case negative public opinion hinders anti-terrorism efforts
and allows extremists to thrive. Finally, a specific set of parameters yields bistable
solutions depending on initial conditions: here, strong public support at the onset
of counter-terrorism operations is shown to be crucial for terrorist activity to be
effectively contained. Sensitive regions in phase space are also identified whereby
small parameter perturbations may strongly affect the final equilibrium configu-
ration: such volatility may represent both a risk and an opportunity for counter-
terrorism agencies as they develop intervention strategies.
1 Mathematical Models of Radicalization and Terrorism 35
A three-way interaction model that includes counter-terrorism efforts, public
opinion, and a community that harbors terrorists is presented in [263]. The harbor-
ing community is assumed to contribute to anti-terrorism efforts, as long as the scale
of these operations is limited. However, once governmental involvement exceeds a
given threshold, the harboring community becomes antagonistic: costs are increased
and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts are reduced. Public opinion on the
other hand is assumed to be supportive of anti-terrorism programs that decrease
attack risks; these programs may be costlier. As a result, counter-terrorism agen-
cies must weigh whether to increase the u2 intensity of their operations to garner
public support, or risk alienating the harboring community, increasing related costs.
It is found that by applying legal constraints to counter-terror efforts, effectively
imposing bounds to the acceptable values of u2, public opinion and the harboring
community may both be steered towards being more supportive of governmental
intervention. Similar issues were explored in Stackelberg games where limits were
posed on interrogation methods and other tactics to extract information from de-
tainees [264].
Game theoretic models have also been applied to study terrorism from different
perspectives. For example, [265, 266] optimized patrol schedules to protect crucial
government assets from terrorist attacks, such as oil pipelines and chemical plants,
under the constraint of limited resources; in the same vein [330] consider a leader-
follower game where the state (the leader) installs facilities and a terrorist group
(the follower) attacks metropolitan areas. The game is played out so that losses due
to terrorist attacks are minimized by the strategic placement of these facilities. How
to best allocate resources to defend sites at risk is also discussed in [268] where the
distinction is made between damage due to chance events and targeted action by
ill-intentioned parties. In the former case, the optimal policy is to invest resources
on target high-priority sites, in the latter to spread resources and protect even the
most vulnerable areas. Other defense strategies are presented in [269, 270, 271].
The work of [272] analyzes the synergy between terrorists and the active or passive
support of one or more state sponsors as they form a coalition to attack a third party
target. Here, the interplay between players changes in time: the state sponsor may
use the terrorist group as a way of covertly promoting hostile acts towards the third
party, but the latter may increasingly become aware of manipulations and retaliate.
Brinkmanship game theoretical models have also been proposed: here one or both
parties push dangerous actions, on the brink of disaster, to get the most advanta-
geous outcome. The challenge is to issue threats that must be sufficiently unpleas-
ant to deter terrorists, but not so repugnant as to not be carried out; these models
thus carry a credibility constraint [273]. The effects of counter-terrorism policies
have been studied in two strategic cases [274]: when government intervention is
defensive, and a corollary to terrorist action, and when it is a proactive substitute
for it. Negative responses may arise in both cases: erosion of terrorist support, if
attacks cause too much damage; backlash against the government, if its response
is too strong. It is found that large-scale attacks will occur if government reactions
produce a strong enough backlash. Game-theoretic network centrality, which iden-
tifies the most influential nodes within a cooperative game, have proven to be useful
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in identifying key members of terrorist networks [275]. Search games have also
been proposed as methods to hunt key radical operatives: terrorists attempt to max-
imize the time to search terrorist networks, while government tries to minimize it
[254]. The scenario of former terrorist organizations seeking a peaceful resolution
to ongoing conflict has also been analyzed [276]. Here, a game of learning is used to
describe negotiations between the two parties, whereby governmental agencies infer
the willingness and the ability of terrorists to commit to the peace process by observ-
ing their actions. Evaluations are then used by the anti-terrorism agency to decide
whether to keep pursuing negotiations or abandon them. Finally, since transnational
terrorist activities can affect policy making in different countries, sequential games
have been introduced involving multiple governmental players so that a country may
choose between a preemptive or a defensive counter-terrorism strategy in response
to the outcome of another country’s strategy. The two may also rationally evaluate
whether it is beneficial to forge an anti-terrorism coalition or engage individually
[277, 278].
1.6 Terrorist events as self-exciting processes
One major question in the study of terrorism is whether the risk of future attacks can
be quantified, drawing on information gathered from past events and using mathe-
matical modeling, risk management or machine learning methods [72, 78, 279, 280,
281, 282, 283]. It is well known that terrorist activity is not entirely random and
that a prior attack can temporarily increase the likelihood of another occurrence
in its geographical vicinity [284, 285]. First attempts in this direction are found in
early studies of terrorism where various time-series analysis were used to study the
frequency of terrorist attacks [286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292], and to explain
both the temporal clustering of events and the long quiescent periods in between
[293, 294, 295, 296].
Mathematically the phenomenon of past events acting as catalysts for future
ones can be described as a self-exciting temporal point process, also known as
the Hawkes process [297, 298] which was first introduced to study contagious
phenomena and to predict earthquake aftershocks [299, 300]. Given that social
behaviors are often of a contagious nature and transmit through human interac-
tions, a wide range of social activities have been studied as self-exciting phe-
nomena. These include committing crimes [301, 302], the sparking of riots [303],
the erupting of political disorder and violence [304], the occurrence of political
turnovers [305] and military coups [306], the clustering of suicides [307], and
even the exchange of email messages [308]. Within the context of terrorism, self-
excitation markers have been found in airplane hijacking incidents during the eight-
ies [309], and in insurgent activities over the last decade [310, 311, 312, 313].
The canonical form of a discrete Hawkes process can be expressed as follows
[284, 297, 298, 299, 301, 302, 309, 314]
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λ (t) = µ(t)+ ∑
i:ti<t
ν(t− ti), (1.26)
where λ (t) > 0 specifies the rate of a terrorist attack at time t, µ(t) > 0 is the
background rate, and the response function ν(s) > 0 defines the elevated rate in
response to an event at a prior time ti. The quantity λ (t)−µ(t) is the self-excitation
contribution to the terrorist attack rate. Typically ν(s) is a decreasing function of t−
ti, so that the enhanced likelihood decays as ti moves into a more distant past. While
other forms of decay functions have been adopted in the literature [315, 316, 317],
a common choice is the exponential form [284, 285, 301, 302, 314, 317, 318]
ν(s) = k0ω exp(−ωs), (1.27)
where ω > 0 specifies how fast the self-exciting effect dissipates over time, and
k0 =
∫ ∞
0 ν(s)ds represents the increased attack rate immediately after a prior attack.
Eqs. 1.26–1.27 with a constant µ(t)≡ µ0 represent the most basic version of a self-
exciting model for terrorist attacks, consisting of only three parameters: µ0, k0, and
ω . For a given time series data 0 ≤ ti ≤ T for i = 1,2,3, ...,n, parameters can be
fitted through the methods of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), which finds
a set of parameter values that maximizes the following log-likelihood function L
[319, 320, 321]
logL =
n
∑
i=1
log(λ (ti))−
∫ T
0
λ (t)dt. (1.28)
The first term on the right hand side of Eq. 1.28 corresponds to the likelihood of
observing a {ti} set given a probability distribution λ (t), while the second term ac-
counts for the constraint
∫ T
0 λ (t)dt = 1. White et al. [316] interpret the three param-
eters that appear in Eq. 1.26 respectively as the “intrinsic risk” (µ0), “volatility” (k0),
and “resilience” (ω−1) of terrorist activities within a country. The same authors ap-
ply the self-exciting model in Eqs. 1.26–1.27 to three southeast Asian countries – In-
donesia, Philippines, and Thailand – finding significant variance among them, con-
sistent with their respective sociopolitical contexts. This study demonstrates that the
simple self-exciting model can be useful in quantitatively assessing terrorist threats
in different geopolitical regions. Regional variations were also found in the underly-
ing mechanisms of daily death tolls in four distinct Iraqi districts [284], and between
Syria and England [322]. Najaf, the relatively more quiescent Iraqi region among
the four districts examined in [284], displays the lowest intensity and shortest decay
time of self-excitation. Syria exhibits highly clustered, self-excited civilian deaths,
while England mainly displays only a background death rate [322]. Regional vari-
ations in the self-exciting parameters µ0, k0 and ω due to local sociopolitics imply
that these parameters may also change temporally. This is shown in [285] where the
dynamics of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Northern Ireland was an-
alyzed. The history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was divided
into five temporal phases, each defined by major events, and Eqs. 1.26–1.27 were
applied to each. Significant changes in model parameters were found across the five
time intervals: for example, when PIRA fractured into smaller cells in phase two,
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Fig. 1.13 Panel (a) shows the histogram of number of fatalities per day in Fallujah, Iraq from
March 20th 2003 to December 31st 2007. Note the emergence of three peaks. Panel (b) shows
the total λ (t), and time-dependent background µ(t), rates fitted from the data in panel (a). Their
difference, λ (t)−µ(t), represents the self-excitation component of the terrorist attack rate. It is in-
teresting to note that the first peak, around day 500, is mostly attributed to self-excitation, whereas
the second and third peaks, around days 1250 and 1500 respectively, are driven primarily by rises
to the background rate. Taken and modified from Ref. [284].
increased background rates, shortened time scales, and decreased volatility were
observed.
While the sparsity of regional terrorism records often hinders the applicability
of overly sophisticated models [315, 316], or yield only marginal gains, the basic
Hawkes process still allows for the inclusion of time dependence in the three funda-
mental parameters, particularly in the background rate µ(t), which should naturally
reflect local socio-political scenarioes. Simple time-dependent functions for µ(t) in-
clude step functions, ramp functions, and heat kernels [284, 317, 323]. An example
of the self-excitation model using a time-dependent µ(t) is displayed in Fig. 1.13,
fitted for the daily death tolls in Fallujah, Iraq from March 20th 2003 to December
31st 2007, showing the respective contributions from the background rate µ(t), and
the self-exciting process λ (t)− µ(t). Lewis et al. [284], Khraibani and Khraibani
[317], and Johnson et al. [323] observe that given sufficient data, models with a con-
stant µ(t) = µ0 are either inadequate or consistently outperformed by models with
time-dependent µ(t). For more flexible time dependence, a nonparametric method
of Maximum Penalized Likelihood Estimation (MPLE) is proposed in [324]. With-
out assuming any specific functional form for µ(t) and ν(t), the method finds the
best fitting functions via a log-likelihood function modified from Eq. 1.28
logL =
n
∑
i=1
log(λ (ti))−
∫ T
0
λ (t)dt−α1R(µ)−α2R(ν), (1.29)
where R is a roughness penalty function (e.g., the L2-norm of the first-order deriva-
tive of µ and ν) which ensures certain regularities of the time-dependent functions
µ and ν , and α1,2 are the relative weights [325]. The basic self-exciting process in
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Eqs. 1.26–1.27 can also be extended to include mutual-excitation, whereby a dis-
tinct set of occurrences occurring at times {τ j} further influence λ (t). A possible
representation is as follows [285]
λ (t) = µ(t)+ ∑
i:ti<t
ν(t− ti)+ ∑
j:τ j<t
η(t− τ j), (1.30)
where the {τ j} timings exert their influence on λ (t) through the cross-response
function η(s). The original study on the distribution of IED attacks by PIRA [285]
was revisited using Eq. 1.30 to examine whether attacks in different North Ireland
counties and its capital Belfast could influence each other. From the analysis it
was concluded that geographic mutual-excitation was far less influential than self-
excitation. A similar conclusion was reached in independent studies of terrorist at-
tacks in Iraq [318]. Here, spatial diffusion was included to the background rate µ(t),
but the resulting analysis failed to capture the regional spread of terrorist activities.
In addition to different geographic regions, the mutual-excitation model in Eq. 1.30
can also be used to examine interactions between different actors. For example, the
IDE attacks by PIRA were further analyzed to verify whether the corresponding
λ (t) was affected by the actions of the British Security Force (BSF) [285]. The in-
teresting finding was that PIRA’s activities intensified much more as a reaction to
Catholic civilian deaths caused by BSF, rather than to direct BSF killings of PIRA
members. Such cross examinations may provide valuable insight for policy makers
in devising guidelines for counter-terrorism operations. Independent work combined
self-exciting processes with the hurdle model to analyze the daily number of terror-
ist attacks in Indonesia between 1994 and 2007 [315]. The hurdle model describes
the frequency-position and the severity-height of events as two separate stochastic
processes [326, 327, 328]. In the work of [315] the dates and number of terrorist
attacks per day are chosen as the frequency and severity of the hurdles, respectively.
Using a Riemann zeta distribution for the severity component, the authors found
that incorporating self-exciting processes in the frequency component improves the
fitting of the hurdle model to the data, and confirmed the hypothesis of a short-term
increase of terrorism risk following an attack.
As for why terrorist activities exhibit self-exciting characteristics, some believe
the reason is economic, as it may be more efficient in terms of costs and bene-
fits to strike as many times as possible before any window of opportunity closes
[329, 330]. Others point to copy-cat behaviors, as terrorists in the same organiza-
tion or like-minded extremists tend to learn from each other. A positive-feedback
may thus be generated through imitation, so that a single act can give rise to a cas-
cade of events [328]. The relationship between the harboring of radical beliefs and
the execution of terrorist attacks may be also addressed using hidden Markov mod-
els, where radical opinions can be regarded as a hidden layer of latent states, from
which terrorist attacks manifest as observables [331, 332]. Regardless of the under-
lying reason, counter-terrorism intelligence may exploit the non-uniform likelihood
of terrorist attacks to optimally allocate resources.
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1.7 Summary and conclusions
In this brief review, we surveyed a few mathematical models that studied radical-
ization trajectories, how extremist groups organize, and patterns of terrorist attacks.
These quantitative models are built from findings derived from the sociological lit-
erature, case studies, interviews and surveys, counter-terror reports, political science
theories, data analysis and empirical observations, which are all limited by the covert
nature of terrorist organizations and by the difficulty in conducting controlled tests.
Much work is still necessary for a more complete understanding of the phenomena at
hand, from all angles. For example, while data and interviews may offer an a poste-
riori understanding of why or how some individuals radicalize or become terrorists,
they cannot explain why others exposed to the same environment do not. Most re-
searchers show that early intervention is the optimal way to avoid the emergence of
large scale radical factions and operative terrorists, but the legal implications of pre-
emptive, invasive policy making must be factored in. Other advancements include a
more rigorous comparative analysis to characterize terrorism in different historical
and sociopolitical contexts, better distinction between online and offline radical-
ization, the emergence of lone wolves as opposed to group dynamics. Developing
novel methods, including machine learning approaches, to dissect information from
material that terrorists themselves divulge, in the form of videos and other internet
content would offer better insight into their modus pensandi. Most work has focused
on traditional attacks, but new forms of terrorism that would elicit different societal
and governmental responses should also be investigated, such as the use of chemi-
cal, biological, radiological weapons. How to prevent the weaponization of trucks,
airplanes, drinks or other materials is also of great concern. Exploring the role of
the media, how to best use the internet as a counter-terrorism tool, how to create
new channels of communications between counter-terror agencies across geograph-
ical boundaries, would help shape innovative intervention methods. Finally, finding
potential pathways out of radicalization, and what to do with former foreign fighters
returning to their home countries are also important issues.
Any attempt to answer these questions must involve experts and practitioners
from many disciplines, from humanities and the social sciences to economics, com-
puter and quantitative scientists. Mathematical modeling has great potential in this
respect, as it allows to build predictive models where the consequences of different
inputs, strategies, and actors may be examined, where costs and information con-
straints may be quantified. However, putative players, strategies and mechanisms
must be cogently included. It is thus important that a common language between
social and mathematical scientists be developed, that academic and practical oppor-
tunities for dialogue be created, and that each community actively engage with the
other. Great care and clarity must be exercised in translating any new finding into
actual policy-making.
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